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Introduction 
In United States v. City of Boston, a federal district court approved a settlement 
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and the city of Boston that 
spotlighted overt discrimination against minority voters and the importance of 
providing language assistance to those voters—not only as a congressional rem-
edy for past discrimination but as a vehicle for increasing civic engagement and 
political participation. The Justice Department had alleged that the city of Bos-
ton had violated Section 2031 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—the act’s major 
language-assistance provision—by failing to provide adequate translation of 
election materials in Spanish and by failing to recruit, appoint, train, and main-
tain an adequate pool of bilingual poll workers.2 In addition, the complaint al-
leged that the city had violated Section 2, the act’s general antidiscrimination 
provision, and other sections of the law in a variety of ways: by treating limited-
English-proficient Latino and Asian-American voters disrespectfully; by refus-
ing to permit these voters to be aided by an assistor of their choice; by improp-
erly influencing, coercing, or ignoring the voters’ ballot choices; by failing to 
make bilingual personnel available to the voters; and by refusing or failing to 
provide provisional ballots.3 
                                                          
1 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a. 
2 Complaint, United States v. City of Boston, No. 05–11598 WGY (D. Mass. July 
29, 2005).  
3 Id. 
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Typical of recent cases, the order in United States v. City of Boston requires 
improved translations of election materials, an adequate supply of bilingual poll 
workers, greater dissemination of multilingual information, federal election moni-
toring, the designation of a language-assistance coordinator, and the creation of a 
community-based advisory body.4 The case is noteworthy, however, because the 
order extended language-based remedies for Section 2 violations to groups of vot-
ers that were not explicitly covered by Section 203’s protections. Although the 
Latino population in Boston was large enough to trigger Section 203 coverage, the 
populations of limited-English-proficient Chinese Americans and Vietnamese 
Americans each fell below the statistical thresholds necessary to invoke Section 
203.5 As remedies for violations of Section 2, the mandates in City of Boston illus-
trate the central role that language assistance can play in redressing discrimination 
against limited-English-proficient voters, even if those voters do not constitute a 
large enough population to invoke formal coverage under Section 203. 
Cases such as United States v. City of Boston illuminate an important trend in 
voting rights law, one in which language assistance is not simply a structural rem-
edy bound by the four corners of the act, but a vehicle designed more broadly to 
accommodate differences among minority voters and to promote meaningful ac-
cess to the political process. In other recent cases, the Justice Department has ob-
tained settlements that have required language assistance to groups falling below 
the statistical benchmarks for Section 203 coverage,6 as well as to groups that are 
not covered by Section 203, such as Arab Americans.7 Moreover, voluntary assis-
tance to noncovered groups has become increasingly common in major cities with 
growing immigrant populations. The Chicago Election Board, for example, is re-
quired under Section 203 to provide language assistance in Spanish and Chinese, 
but also provides voluntary assistance in languages such as Polish, Russian, Greek, 
German, Korean, and Serbian.8 And the city of Boston, notwithstanding the Jus-
tice Department’s 2005 lawsuit, had already made commitments to provide voter 
materials in Spanish, Haitian Creole, Vietnamese, Cape Verdean Creole, Portu-
guese, Chinese, and Russian.9 
                                                          
4 United States v. City of Boston, No. 05–11598 WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2005) 
(three-judge court). 
5 Chinese-American voting age citizens in Boston numbered 9,825, while Vietnam-
ese-American voting age citizens numbered 4,220. See Complaint, United States v. City 
of Boston, supra note 2, at ¶ 10. 
6 See Memorandum of Agreement, United States v. San Diego County, No. 
04CV1273JEG (S.D. Cal. 2004) ¶ 26 (requiring language assistance in Vietnamese where 
population numbers fell just below 10,000).  
7 See United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00–73541(E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2000) 
(requiring language assistance in Arabic and Bengali as a remedy for voter intimidation 
and harassment). 
8 See http://www.chicagoelections.com/table_of_contents.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 
2006). 
9 See http://www.cityofboston.gov/newbostonians/voterkit.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 
2006).  
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Yet moving beyond a strictly remedial basis for language assistance under the 
Voting Rights Act raises significant political and constitutional questions. Political 
support for language assistance in voting is hardly universal. Arguments for Eng-
lish-only elections to limit financial costs and to underscore the role of English as 
a civic lingua franca continue to animate opposition to language assistance under 
the act. Indeed, there have been numerous attempts in recent years to repeal the 
act’s language assistance provisions, including a proposed amendment in 2006 to 
H.R. 9, the bill that reauthorized the language assistance provisions for an addi-
tional twenty-five years.10 Moreover, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases have lim-
ited the scope of congressional power to remedy constitutional and civil rights 
violations committed by state governments and have made antidiscrimination liti-
gation increasingly problematic. Without a strong evidentiary record to justify 
congressional action, legislation designed to enforce guarantees of equality under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments may be constitutionally suspect. 
This chapter examines the expansion of language assistance under the Voting 
Rights Act from a structural remedy for past discrimination to a broader vehicle of 
language accommodation that encourages political participation by limited-
English-proficient voters. Part I of the chapter examines various antidiscrimination 
models under the Voting Rights Act, including Section 203 and the act’s more 
general civil rights protections for limited-English-proficient voters. Part II offers 
a model of language accommodation that expands current voting rights jurispru-
dence, drawing on legal theories of language rights and extant antidiscrimination 
standards outside of voting. Part III suggests a framework for incorporating lan-
guage-accommodation norms into enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, as well 
as additional vehicles for protecting language rights, such as Title VI of the Civil 
Rights of 1964 and election laws such as the Help America Vote Act of 2002. 
I. Language Minorities and the Voting Rights Act 
To trace the growth of language assistance from its roots as a structural antidis-
crimination remedy to an evolving norm of language accommodation, this sec-
tion discusses various language-assistance mandates under the Voting Rights 
Act. Section 203 of the act is the primary federal mandate requiring assistance to 
language minorities, but other provisions of the Voting Rights Act provide addi-
                                                          
10 In July of 2006, during floor votes on the reauthorization of the Voting Rights 
Act, the House of Representatives defeated, by a vote of 238–185, an amendment offered 
by Representative Steve King to H.R. 9 that would have eliminated Section 203 of the 
Voting Rights Act. See http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/109/house/2/votes/ 
372/ Similarly, in August of 1996, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 123, the 
“Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1996,” which would have de-
clared English to be the official language of the United States and would have repealed 
the language assistance provisions of the Voting Rights Act. See http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/query/z?c104:H.R.123: The Senate did not vote on the bill.  
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tional, but underutilized, bases for protecting the rights of limited-English-
proficient voters. The various protections also represent significantly different 
models of civil rights enforcement. Language assistance provisions such as Sec-
tion 203 typify a structural remediation model of voting rights law that ad-
dresses past discrimination against identified groups. Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, which has covered language minorities since 1975, typifies the tra-
ditional antidiscrimination model found in many civil rights laws prohibiting 
policies of differential treatment and disparate impact against minorities. Fi-
nally, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, a provision added in 1982 to im-
prove electoral access to disabled and illiterate voters, typifies an individual 
accommodation model that has gained strength in recent years in civil rights 
enforcement affecting the physically or mentally disabled. Although comple-
mentary, the combination of these models nonetheless fails to offer a systematic 
approach that fully addresses the rights of limited-English-proficient voters. 
A. Language Minorities and the 1975 Amendments 
By expanding the reach and requirements of the original Voting Rights Act 
to include language minorities, the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act 
were designed to promote two major goals. One goal was to clarify the act’s 
coverage of certain racial and ethnic minorities—Latinos in particular—who had 
suffered discrimination in the political process, but whose group status under the 
law remained uncertain. Defining the “Hispanic” or “Latino” population was 
problematic under the original act because its members, by self-designation or 
by ascription, often eluded clear racial categorization and transcended strict ra-
cial labels such as “black” and “white.” The “language minority” category was 
created to ensure full voting rights protections for individuals of “Spanish heri-
tage,” as well as for American Indians, Asian Americans, and Alaska Natives.11 
                                                          
11 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(3); id. § 1973aa-1a(e). The legislative history of the 1975 
amendments also reveals a clear congressional intent to expand the act’s coverage beyond 
black-white racial discrimination. See S. Rep. No. 94–295, at 35–37 (1975), reprinted in 
1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 802–04. Although groups such as Asian Americans would have 
been considered racial groups even under the 1965 act, their addition through the lan-
guage-minority amendments, along with the addition of Latinos and Native Americans, 
was grounded in both the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantees and the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibitions on racial discrimination in voting. Congress relied 
on equal protection doctrine, under which the courts had already recognized that classifi-
cations based on national origin, like racial classifications, were presumptively unconsti-
tutional, as the basis for extending the act to categories that eluded definition based on 
racial criteria, but were nonetheless the basis for extensive discrimination. See Keyes v. 
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477–79 
(1954). However, Congress’s choice to employ “language minority” status, rather than a 
broader and more commonly used category such as “national origin” or “ethnicity,” ef-
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Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to incorporate the language minority 
categories in a manner that ensured that the act’s Section 5 preclearance re-
quirements extended to language minority populations.12 Congress also amended 
Section 2, the general and permanent antidiscrimination provision of the act, to 
add coverage for language minorities.13 
A second goal of the 1975 amendments was to establish a set of structural 
remedies to address both past and ongoing discrimination against limited-English-
proficient minorities.14 Congress determined that educational discrimination, in-
cluding overt segregation and disparities in public school funding and resource 
allocations, had led to high rates of illiteracy among language minorities through-
out the country.15 These educational inequalities, combined with discrimination 
                                                                                                                                  
fectively limited the act’s coverage to the enumerated groups, excluding other groups that 
might have been covered under a category defined differently. 
12 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f). Section 5 requires state and local governments with an ex-
tensive history of discrimination that has resulted in depressed minority political partici-
pation to “preclear” any changes to their electoral procedures either through administra-
tive review by the Department of Justice or a declaratory judgment by a three-judge panel 
of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. A change must have neither a 
discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory effect. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Moreover, the 
act’s ban on the use of a voting “test or device” was extended to ban English-only proce-
dures for elections where a language-minority group constitutes over 5% of the voting 
age population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(3). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).  
14 Section 4(e) of the original Act had already recognized the connection between 
English-language-proficiency and voting discrimination in the case of Puerto Rican vot-
ers, many of whom had been educated in Spanish-dominant educational environments; 
the act prohibits English-only literacy tests for “persons educated in American-flag 
schools in which the predominant classroom language was other than English.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973b(e). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 4(e) in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
15 Section 4(f)(1) states:  
The Congress finds that voting discrimination against citizens of language mi-
norities is pervasive and national in scope. Such minority citizens are from envi-
ronments in which the dominant language is other than English. In addition they 
have been denied equal educational opportunities by State and local governments, 
resulting in severe disabilities and continuing illiteracy in the English language. 
The Congress further finds that, where State and local officials conduct elections 
only in English, language minority citizens are excluded from participating in the 
electoral process. In many areas of the country, this exclusion is aggravated by 
acts of physical, economic, and political intimidation. The Congress declares that, 
in order to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to 
the United States Constitution, it is necessary to eliminate such discrimination by 
prohibiting English-only elections, and by prescribing other remedial devices. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1). In addition, Section 203(a) states:  
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and intimidation in the electoral process, produced low rates of voter registration 
and voting among language-minority groups.16 Congress thus recognized the de-
nial of voting rights inherent in many English-only election procedures and cre-
ated two remedial vehicles requiring translated election materials, oral interpreta-
tion and aid, and other language-sensitive assistance: Section 4(f) and Section 203. 
Because Congress found nationwide discrimination affecting language minorities, 
neither of the provisions requires proof of intentional discrimination or discrimina-
tory effect by a local jurisdiction; implementation requires only that the jurisdic-
tion satisfy the appropriate triggering formula. 
Section 4(f), which targets a limited number of jurisdictions with long histo-
ries of discrimination, prohibits English-only materials and requires language as-
sistance in areas that satisfy a triggering formula that combines a language-
minority group’s size (over 5%), the use of English-only procedures, and low 
voter registration and turnout.17 Under Section 203, which applies nationwide, a 
variety of triggering formulas assess minority group size and high rates of illiter-
acy (measured by educational completion below the fifth grade) to determine lan-
guage-assistance coverage. As originally enacted and as amended in 1982, Section 
203 mandates language assistance in a state or political subdivision in which more 
than 5% of the voting-age citizens are members of a language-minority group and 
are limited-English-proficient, and where the illiteracy rate for that group exceeds 
the national illiteracy rate.18 To address the problem of excluding coverage for 
                                                                                                                                  
The Congress finds that, through the use of various practices and procedures, citi-
zens of language minorities have been effectively excluded from participation in 
the electoral process. Among other factors, the denial of the right to vote of such 
minority group citizens is ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational 
opportunities afforded them, resulting in high illiteracy and low voting participa-
tion. The Congress declares that, in order to enforce the guarantees of the four-
teenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, it is necessary 
to eliminate such discrimination by prohibiting these practices, and by prescribing 
other remedial devices. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(a). 
16 See id. 
17 Section 4(f) prohibits English-only materials and requires language assistance in 
states and political subdivisions where (1) over 5% of the voting age citizens were, on 
November 1, 1972, members of a language-minority group, (2) where registration and 
election materials were provided only in English on that date, and (3) less than 50% of 
the voting-age citizens were registered to vote or voted in the 1972 presidential election. 
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). By using information from 1972, the 
section focuses on areas with more serious histories of discrimination. Additionally, ju-
risdictions that satisfy the triggering formula must obtain preclearance of changes in elec-
tion procedures under Section 5 of the Act, See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.  
18 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A). Congress amended Section 203 in 1982 to re-
quire that a language-minority group also be limited-English-proficient in order to satisfy 
 Language Accommodation and the Voting Rights Act 7 
  
large numbers of language-minority voters who might not meet the 5% test in 
many of the country’s largest population centers, Congress amended Section 203 
in 1992 to impose an additional test, focusing on absolute numbers: a jurisdiction 
with a language-minority group constituting a population with over 10,000 voting-
age limited-English-proficient citizens and possessing an illiteracy rate above the 
national average is also covered.19 
Although designed to be temporary measures, the language-assistance provi-
sions of the act have been in place for over three decades and were extended in 
2006 for an additional twenty-five years.20 Notwithstanding this history, recent 
litigation and election monitoring by community-based organizations have illumi-
nated ongoing problems of noncompliance with the act and its implementing regulations.21 
Common problems have revolved around inadequate numbers of trained bilingual poll 
workers, incomplete or insufficient amounts of translated election materials, and the failure 
to develop translated materials for the Internet and other electronic media. Group-specific 
issues such as transposing or incorrectly translating candidate names in Asian languages 
such as Chinese or Korean, mistranslating ballot initiative and referendum language, and 
establishing differential screening procedures for language-minority voters have also been 
well documented.22 
In addition, monitoring groups have chronicled numerous instances of voter intimida-
tion, harassment, and discrimination (including the denial of ballots) against limited-
English-proficient voters in many areas covered by Section 4(f) and Section 203.23 En-
forcement of Section 203 by the Justice Department has been inconsistent as well. As the 
department’s Voting Rights Section itself has divulged, more litigation had been filed since 
                                                                                                                                  
the statistical benchmark, which led to a reduction in the number of eligible jurisdictions. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 102–655, at 7 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 766, 771. 
19 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A). The 1992 amendments also expanded Section 
203’s coverage to include political subdivisions that contain all or any part of an Indian 
reservation in which over 5% of the residents are members of a single language group, 
are limited-English-proficient, and possess an illiteracy rate exceeding the national aver-
age. Id.  
20 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reau-
thorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). 
President Bush signed the reauthorization bill into law on July 27, 2006. 
21 Recent language minority litigation by the U.S. Justice Department is highlighted 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/caselist.htm#sec203cases (last visited Sept. 
13, 2006).  
22 See National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium, Sound Barriers: Asian 
Americans and Language Access in Election 2004 (2005); Asian American Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, Asian American Access to Democracy in the 2004 Elections 
(2005); Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian American Access to the Vote: The Language Assis-
tance Provisions (Section 203) of the Voting Rights Act and Beyond, 11 ASIAN L. J. 31, 
37–48 (2004).  
23 Magpantay, supra note 22; Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in Amer-
ica’s Polling Places: How They Can Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401, 
410-15 (2002). 
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May 2004 than had been filed in the prior eight years,24 which partly reflects the addition of 
new jurisdictions and language groups following the decennial census of 2000, but no doubt 
also reflects significant underenforcement of Section 203 in previous years. 
B. The Structural Remediation Model and the Language-Assistance 
Provisions 
Like the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirement, Section 4(f) and Section 203 
are predicated on congressional findings of past discrimination and are designed to create 
structural remedies that are limited in time and scope. Consistent with their origins as 
remedial devices, Section 4(f) and Section 203 restrict their coverage in a number 
of important ways. First, the definition of “language minority” is limited to spe-
cific groups that Congress determined to have suffered significant discrimination 
in education and in the political process. Only language groups whose members 
are of Spanish heritage, American Indian, Asian American, or Alaska Native are 
covered. Congress has chosen to omit limited-English-proficient voters from other 
racial and ethnic groups from the act because discrimination against other groups 
has not been as serious and has not resulted in comparably depressed levels of 
political participation.25 Thus, limited-English-proficient voters whose primary 
language is European (other than Spanish), African, Middle Eastern, or Caribbean 
are not covered by the Voting Rights Act’s language-assistance mandates, group 
population size or level of illiteracy notwithstanding.26 
Second, the coverage mechanisms under Section 4(f) and Section 203 reflect 
Congress’s employment of cost-benefit tradeoffs that limit assistance to the largest 
language-minority populations. The right to receive governmental assistance in 
one’s primary language is triggered only if one’s group size is substantial and can 
justify the government’s expense of providing assistance. Surpassing either the 5% 
benchmark or the numerical benchmark of 10,000 invokes Section 203’s language 
assistance requirements and any attendant rights. However, no statutory right to 
government-sponsored language assistance attaches—and thus none can be denied 
through English-only procedures—if a voter is a member of a language-minority 
group that is too small by congressional standards.27 
                                                          
24 http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_203/activ_203.htm#enforcement (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2006). 
25 See S. Rep. No. 94–295, at 31 (1975), reprinted at 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 798 
(highlighting census data showing that political participation rates in the 1972 presiden-
tial election for voters of European origin greatly exceeded the rates for language-
minority groups). 
26 These groups can, however, be protected against violations of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act on the basis of racial discrimination, and language assistance may be 
an appropriate remedy to address the Section 2 violation. 
27 Even with these various limitations, many states and political subdivisions are 
covered by Section 4(f) and Section 203. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 55 & app. All of Alaska (for 
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Third, Section 203’s illiteracy preconditions require a clear relationship be-
tween educational inequality and language assistance. Congress’s findings have 
documented the links between discrimination in education, high levels of illiter-
acy, and depressed political participation. While a sizable language-minority 
group may contain high numbers of adult immigrants who were educated abroad 
and completed their education beyond the fifth-grade level, large numbers of the 
same group might lack English literacy above the fifth-grade level, which can dif-
fer significantly from a figure based solely on grade completion. Thus a language 
group might not satisfy the requirement that the group’s illiteracy rate exceed the 
national rate, even though many voters might lack the necessary proficiency in 
English to participate in the political process.28 The act’s illiteracy requirements 
ignore this distinction and make the connection between past discrimination in 
U.S.-based education and language-assistance remedies especially strong. The 
language assistance provisions thus establish a remedial structure that is inherently 
cabined and subject to cost-benefit balancing.  
C. Alternative Enforcement Models: Section 2 and Section 208 
The act offers additional protections to limited-English-proficient voters 
through two other enforcement models: (1) the general antidiscrimination provi-
sion contained in Section 2 of the act and (2) the voting assistor of choice provi-
sion contained in Section 208 of the act. Both of these sections—applied in tan-
dem with Section 203 claims—have been employed in recent Justice Department 
litigation designed to promote language assistance in local jurisdictions. Neither 
model, however, provides sufficient protections to limited-English-proficient vot-
ers to ensure widespread and meaningful access to the vote. 
                                                                                                                                  
Alaskan Native languages), Arizona (for Spanish), and Texas (for Spanish) are covered 
by Section 4(f), as are political subdivisions in seven states (for Spanish or American 
Indian languages). Section 203’s coverage extends to jurisdictions in over thirty states, 
with some covered for multiple language groups. For example, California’s Los Angeles 
County must provide assistance to Spanish-speakers and five Asian-language groups 
(Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese); Arizona’s Pima County must 
provide assistance in Spanish and two American Indian languages (Yaqui and Tohono 
O’Odham); and Alaska’s Lake and Peninsula Borough must provide assistance in Atha-
bascan, Aleut, and Eskimo. See Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1992, Determinations 
Under Section 203, 67 Fed. Reg. 48871 (July 26, 2002). 
28 In the 1990s, for example, Korean-American voters in Los Angeles County, de-
spite possessing over twice the population needed to satisfy the 10,000 numerical bench-
mark, did not qualify for language assistance because their illiteracy rate did not exceed 
the national rate. See Magpantay, supra note 22, at 50. After the 2000 census, Korean 
Americans were covered under Section 203 because census data revealed a group illiter-
acy rate above the national average. See Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1992, Deter-
minations Under Section 203, 67 Fed. Reg. 48871 (July 26, 2002).  
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1. Section 2 and the Traditional Antidiscrimination Model 
By prohibiting policies that can result in a denial or abridgement of the right 
to vote, Section 2 offers the most general scope of protection for language minori-
ties under the Voting Rights Act. Like other federal antidiscrimination statutes 
such as Title VI29 and Title VII30 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and their accom-
panying regulations, Section 2 applies nationwide, has no numerical trigger based 
on group size, and requires a determination of either intentional discrimination or 
discriminatory effects resulting from a challenged practice. Section 2 is unusual 
among federal antidiscrimination laws, however, in that its protections beyond 
race or color are circumscribed by the definition of language minorities; Section 2 
is bound by the same definition that applies to Section 4(f) and Section 203.31 Sec-
tion 2 is thus more explicit than other antidiscrimination laws in recognizing lan-
guage minority discrimination, but individuals or groups who fall outside the pro-
tected language-minority classes cannot assert claims unless their allegations are 
based on race or color.32 
In practice, Section 2 litigation on behalf of language minority plaintiffs has 
not typically focused on language-based discrimination. Most claims have in-
volved vote dilution, such as challenges to discriminatory at-large election systems 
or redistricting plans and have proceeded as if they were race-based claims. How-
ever, in United States v. City of Hamtramck, language assistance did play a central 
role in the remedial portion of a consent decree involving racial discrimination. 
The Hamtramck case revolved around race- and color-based claims brought on 
behalf of Arab-American and darker-skinned Asian-American voters whose citi-
zenship and voter qualifications were challenged by members of a private citizens 
group during the November 1999 election in Hamtramck, Michigan—a problem 
that local election officials did not address.33 In order to address voter intimidation 
and harassment, the Hamtramck settlement required the training of officials on 
appropriate procedures for challenging voters and on methods to address voter 
intimidation. The consent decree went further and required that notices be pre-
pared in English, Arabic, and Bengali to inform voters about the new practices and 
that bilingual workers be hired to assist on election day. Language assistance thus 
became a significant element of a remedy for Section 2 violations based on race 
and color, but not on language discrimination per se. 
                                                          
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d- 2000d-4a. 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
31 In Hernandez v. Woodard, 714 F.Supp. 963, 968–69 (N.D. Ill. 1989), a federal 
district court found that Section 2 claims on behalf of language minorities need not be 
coupled with Section 203’s statistical threshold (5%) in order to move forward. 
32 Recent case law interpreting the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on racial dis-
crimination in voting to include ancestry-based classifications may provide support for a 
broader interpretation of “race” under the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 
528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
33 United States v. City of Hamtramck, No. 00–73541 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 7, 2000). 
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Section 2 claims predicated on limited-English-proficiency are uncommon 
and have only recently appeared in conjunction with section 203 enforcement ac-
tions by the Department of Justice.34 In United States v. City of Boston, for in-
stance, the Justice Department alleged that the city had violated Section 203 by 
failing to provide adequate Spanish-language assistance, but also alleged several 
Section 2 violations involving Spanish speakers, as well as limited-English-
proficient Chinese-American and Vietnamese-American voters who had been 
treated disrespectfully by election workers, had been ignored or improperly influ-
enced in making ballot choices, and a Help America Vote Act violation that these 
voters had been denied provisional ballots.35 The consent decree resolving the Bos-
ton case included a set of policies common in Section 203 settlement agree-
ments—improved translations of materials, employment of a sufficient number of 
bilingual poll workers, dissemination of multilingual information, federal monitor-
ing, and the development of a language-assistance coordinator position and a 
community-based advisory body. However, the Section 2 remedies were merged 
with Section 203 mandates by requiring language assistance to all three groups, 
even though only one group (Spanish speakers) was sufficiently large to be cov-
ered by Section 203.  
The antidiscrimination model available under Section 2 is evolving and may 
become a more significant source for language assistance, even when claims focus 
on racial discrimination or on language-minority group membership independent 
of actual language proficiency. Nevertheless, Section 2’s language-assistance ju-
risprudence remains underdeveloped, and Section 2 enforcement has inherent 
limitations because it requires litigation and is tethered to the law’s remedial lan-
guage assistance definitions. 
2. Section 208 and the Individual Accommodation Model 
In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act by adding Section 208, 
which states in part that “any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of 
blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a per-
son of the voter’s choice.”36 Although established primarily as an accommodation 
measure for disabled and illiterate voters, Section 208 has been applied to limited-
English-proficient voters when those voters require assistance to understand an 
English-only ballot. In formulating Section 208, Congress recognized that having 
the assistance of a person of one’s own choice may be “the only way to assure 
meaningful voting assistance and to avoid possible intimidation or manipulation of 
                                                          
34 See, e.g., United States v. City of Boston, No. 05-11598 WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 
2005) (three-judge court); United States v. Berks County, 277 F. Supp. 2d 570 (E.D. Pa. 
2003).  
35 United States v. City of Boston, No. 05–11598 WGY (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2005) 
(three-judge court). 
36 42 U.S.C. 1973aa-6. Section 208 contains an exception precluding an assistor who 
is “the voter’s employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter’s un-
ion.” Id. 
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the voter.”37 Section 208 applies nationwide and is not bound by the group defini-
tions specified in the act’s remedial language assistance sections. 
Although Section 208 imposes no affirmative obligations on state or local 
governments to provide language assistance, it does create the basis for a Voting 
Rights Act violation if election officials impede or deny a voter’s use of an as-
sistor in order to vote. For example, in United States v. Berks County, a federal 
district court found that barring Puerto Rican voters in Reading, Pennsylvania, 
from bringing their assistors of choice into the voting booth reflected an exten-
sive pattern of “hostile and unequal treatment of Hispanic and Spanish-speaking 
voters by poll officials.”38 The court noted that when poll officials deny voters 
the right to bring their assistor of choice into the voting booth, “voters feel un-
comfortable with the process, do not understand the ballot, do not know how to 
operate the voting machine, and cannot cast a meaningful vote.”39 The Berks 
County court ordered multiple remedies, including the development of Spanish-
language publicity and election materials and the training of poll workers on the 
mandates of Section 208. 
Similarly, in United States v. Miami-Dade County, Haitian-American voters 
who needed assistance in Creole were denied the full and effective use of assis-
tors of choice in the November 2000 presidential election.40 Poll workers denied 
the use of assistors to many voters, and when assistance was allowed, it was 
often limited to demonstrations of voting procedures outside the voting booth. A 
consent decree required, among other things, new training programs for poll 
workers, voter education policies, and the employment of bilingual election em-
ployees in targeted precincts. Despite falling outside the coverage of Section 4(f) 
or Section 203, limited-English-proficient Haitian Creole speakers—like any 
limited-English-proficient voters who need the help of an assistor—fell within 
the protection of Section 208. 
Section 208 typifies an accommodation model of civil rights enforcement 
that is common in disability law, although Section 208 is a weak version that 
imposes minimal obligations on government.41 Section 208 focuses on a legally 
recognized trait or characteristic (blindness, disability, or the inability to read or 
write in English) as well as the accompanying limitation in casting a meaningful 
vote that arises from that trait or characteristic and requires a benefit or ser-
                                                          
37 S. Rep. No 97–417, at 62 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 240–41. 
38 Order, United States v. Berks County, No. 03-CV-1030 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2003), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/berks_order.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 
2006). 
39 Id. 
40 See Consent Order, United States v. Miami-Dade County, No. 02-21698, (S.D. 
Fla. June 17, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_2/miamidade_ 
cd.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). 
41 For a general discussion of the differences between traditional antidiscrimination 
law and disability accommodation law, see Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen, 
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1 (1996). 
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vice—an accommodation—to help the voter overcome the limitation and gain 
full access to the ballot. A violation of the statutory right occurs when the ac-
commodation is denied.  
Like other disability laws, Section 208 fosters highly specific and personal-
ized assistance, since the voter determines who will provide the assistance and 
what will be needed. However, the law imposes no standards on the quality of 
the assistance provided to the voter, nor does it impose significant obligations on 
government to ensure meaningful access to voting. The costs under Section 208 
are borne almost entirely by the private assistor and the affected voter, who also 
bears the responsibility of arranging the assistance. The primary costs that state 
and local election officials assume are expenses relating to training staff to pre-
vent violations of the law, such as interference with voters and their assistors. 
Jurisdictions bear no costs in actually having to provide language assistance to 
the limited-English-proficient voter.  
Taken in combination, the remedial language assistance provisions in Sec-
tions 203 and 4(f), the antidiscrimination requirements of Section 2, and the 
accommodation provision in Section 208 provide an array of potential enforce-
ment tools, but form a network of laws with significant theoretical and practical 
gaps. Section 4(f) and Section 203 offer structural remedies that do not require 
individual findings of discrimination, but they are temporary and incomplete 
remedies. Section 2 jurisprudence on language rights is inchoate and bound by a 
definition of language-minority groups that is specific but underinclusive; more-
over, claims must be litigated and language assistance does not necessarily fol-
low as a remedy. Section 208 is arguably the broadest enforcement mechanism 
for language assistance in the Voting Rights Act as it allows any limited-
English-proficient voter to have assistance in voting, but the responsibilities for 
providing the accommodation fall largely on voters themselves, not on the gov-
ernment entities that administer elections. 
The potential for weaving together the different Voting Rights Act provi-
sions has found partial expression in recent litigation, however, and reconciling 
the norms that underlie the various sections of the law can lead to a more effec-
tive model of voting rights enforcement. The next section attempts to reconcile 
the strands of language rights enforcement under the act by offering a theory of 
language accommodation drawing on antidiscrimination laws that focus on pro-
viding language assistance and meaningful access in a variety of settings. 
II. From Remediation to Language Accommodation 
While various provisions of the Voting Rights Act address language-
accommodation norms, Congress has not attempted to address the needs of lim-
ited-English-proficient voters in a systematic or integrated way. In its 2006 reau-
thorization of the remedial language assistance provisions for an additional 
twenty-five years, Congress instituted only minor substantive amendments, fo-
cused primarily on the type of demographic data to be employed in determining 
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coverage, and made no changes to the language-assistance triggering mecha-
nisms or to the scope of coverage for language-minority groups.42 Formulating a 
more coherent basis for language assistance is essential to ensure meaningful 
access to the vote and to develop future voting rights enforcement strategies and 
legislation. 
A. Accommodation Norms in Theory and Practice 
 Although Section 4(f) and Section 203 are designed to be temporary measures 
that address longstanding discrimination against particular groups, they contain the 
seeds of a broader language-accommodation norm that has roots in both normative 
legal theory and existing laws addressing discrimination on the basis of religion 
and disability. Following from this norm is a legal regime that must recognize 
significant differences and limitations affecting the ability to participate fully in 
democratic life, imposes responsibilities and duties on appropriate actors to correct 
these limitations (subject to some degree of balancing against exceptional costs 
and hardships), and establishes civil rights causes of action when the duties are not 
satisfied or are impeded. 
1. Accommodation and Democratic Participation 
The question of providing language assistance to limited-English-proficient 
voters falls within a set of larger debates about the role of languages other than 
English in public life; civic unity and the assimilation of newcomers into Ameri-
can society; the responsibilities of government to its citizens and residents; and the 
basic goals of antidiscrimination law.43 Outside of the voting rights context, there 
have been significant public debates in recent years over the use of bilingual edu-
cation in the public schools, as well as the mandating of English as the official 
language of government, with initiatives and proposed statutes populating state 
ballots and legislative agendas.44 The discord over language access and govern-
ment-sponsored assistance has been particularly acute, because it has been tied to 
                                                          
42 Section 8 of H.R. 9 states: “Section 203(b)(2)(A) of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 (42 U.S.C. 1973aa-1a(b)(2)(A)) is amended by striking ‘census data’ and inserting 
‘the 2010 American Community Survey census data and subsequent American Commu-
nity Survey data in 5-year increments, or comparable census data.’” Fannie Lou Hamer, 
Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (July 26, 2006). 
43 See Ronald Schmidt, Sr., LANGUAGE POLICY AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2000); LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND POLITICAL THEORY (Will Kymlicka and 
Alan Patten eds., 2003). 
44 See, e.g., Crystal Goodson Wilkerson, Comment, Patriotism or Prejudice: Ala-
bama’s Official English Amendment, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 253 (2003–2004); William Ryan, 
Note, The Unz Initiatives and the Abolition of Bilingual Education, 43 B.C. L. REV. 487 
(2002). 
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ongoing controversies over immigration policy and over linguistic and cultural 
diversity in American society. 
Within these larger debates, language assistance in voting has been especially 
contentious because of conflicting views over the rights and responsibilities of 
voters, particularly those who are naturalized citizens. There is little disagreement 
that voting is essential for democratic governance and that discriminatory barriers 
to participation in the political process should be eliminated. Yet the role of Eng-
lish in voting and the electoral process is subject to more heated dispute. Notwith-
standing arguments criticizing the administrative and financial costs of providing 
language assistance, many detractors of language assistance philosophically op-
pose attempts to diminish the role of English as a civic unifier and a political lin-
gua franca. Many see language assistance as a deterrent to learning English and a 
disruption to assimilation into American society. Indeed, opponents of language 
assistance consider basic fluency in English to be a core element of American citi-
zenship and point specifically to the requirements for naturalized citizenship, 
which, except for cases involving long-term elderly residents, include minimal 
literacy in English.45 
On the other hand, support for language-assistance policies draws on funda-
mental values of democratic participation and political empowerment for all citi-
zens, as well as the need to eliminate discrimination and barriers to participation, 
including linguistic barriers.46 Arguments to make English proficiency a necessary 
precondition for citizenship and voting have multiple flaws. While rudimentary 
knowledge of English is a requirement for most of those seeking naturalized citi-
zenship, the threshold for minimal English literacy required for naturalization falls 
well below what is needed to fully understand a ballot, particularly one containing 
complicated initiatives or referenda. Moreover, as Congress itself recognized in 
passing the language assistance provisions in 1975, past and ongoing educational 
discrimination that leads to low levels of literacy can affect both immigrants and 
native-born citizens, including Puerto Ricans educated in Spanish-dominant 
schools and Native Americans.47 
                                                          
45 8 U.S.C. § 1423. The naturalization laws create exceptions for citizenship appli-
cants who are over the age of 50 and have resided in the United States as a lawful perma-
nent resident for over 20 years, or are over the age of 55 and have resided in the U.S. for 
over 15 years. These individuals need not demonstrate English literacy, but must still 
fulfill other statutory requirements, including demonstrating knowledge of American 
government and civics.  
46 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Accommodating Linguistic Difference: Toward a 
Comprehensive Theory of Language Rights in the United States, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 133 (2001); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
687 (2006). 
47 In the case of Native Americans, maintenance of native languages is not only de-
sirable, but strongly supported by federal policies. See Native American Languages Act 
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–524, 106 Stat. 3434 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2991b-3, 2992d(e) (2001)). 
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Normative arguments for language rights and language pluralism thus suggest 
that public policies should support multiple objectives that broaden democratic 
participation, such as: prohibiting language discrimination; encouraging language 
assistance and English-language education for the limited-English-proficient to 
foster their incorporation into American society; and providing public support for 
the use and retention of languages other than English, which is essential in an in-
creasingly globalized society.48 Strong versions of these arguments propose that 
both antidiscrimination law and social welfare policies should establish regimes 
that recognize the right to use a language of one’s choice, that prohibit infringe-
ments on these rights, and that impose responsibilities to provide language assis-
tance across various sectors. Although antidiscrimination policy is not a substitute 
for social welfare policies or electoral policies that mandate language assistance 
through budget appropriations, it can recognize sources of discrimination, like 
English-only rules, and impose responsibilities to accommodate language needs 
and address discrimination. 
Consistent with these normative theories, language assistance within the vot-
ing rights arena—independent of remediation—can advance two important and 
parallel goals: (1) promoting equality by preventing the subordination of limited-
English-proficient citizens who are unable to participate in the political process 
because of language barriers, and (2) promoting civic engagement and political 
participation by voters who might otherwise be deterred or unable to participate in 
the political process without language assistance. These goals are fully comple-
mentary: empirical evidence on recent enforcement of the language assistance 
provisions in Section 203 jurisdictions suggests that language-based remedies cre-
ate incentives to greater democratic participation, leading to increased voter regis-
tration and voter turnout.49 
If one accepts the premise that there are sufficiently strong interests in ad-
dressing subordination and promoting civic engagement for limited-English-
proficient voters to justify language assistance, the more difficult questions that 
follow focus on the type of legal regime to impose and on the appropriate alloca-
                                                          
48 See Schmidt, supra note 46, at 130–62 (comparing linguistic pluralism and as-
similationism arguments).  
49 See H.R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 20 (2006) (House Judiciary Committee Re-
port finding “increases in language minority citizen registration and turnout rates 
are most significant in jurisdictions that are in compliance with Section 203’s elec-
tion assistance requirements” and reporting Justice Department data that “en-
forcement of Section 203 has resulted in ‘significantly narrowed gaps in electoral 
participation. [For example, in] San Diego County, California, Spanish and Fili-
pino registration are up over 21 percent and Vietnamese registration is up 37 per-
cent.”); see also National Commission on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Mi-
nority Voters: The Voting Rights Act at Work, 1982–2005, at 74–75, available at 
http://www.votingrightsact.org/report/finalreport.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) 
(summarizing recent increases in voter registration and turnout in Latino, Native 
American, and Asian American communities). 
 Language Accommodation and the Voting Rights Act 17 
  
tion of the resources and burdens that accompany language assistance. For in-
stance, if a minimal goal is to provide an opportunity for voters to obtain some 
measure of language assistance, Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act already pro-
vides the basis for voters to receive language assistance through private, personal 
assistors, and a token allocation of public resources. On the other hand, a legal 
regime that imposes governmental duties to provide language assistance to any 
limited-English-proficient voter who needs it would entail significant public costs 
and could generate thorny questions regarding the appropriate scope of a federal 
antidiscrimination law compared to a public services or welfare policy. 
Between the poles lies a norm that advances the equality and civic engage-
ment interests, balances competing benefits and costs, and falls within the appro-
priate and constitutional scope of the Voting Rights Act. The next section exam-
ines the insights and limitations of existing antidiscrimination laws to help inform 
this analysis. 
2. Accommodation in Antidiscrimination Law 
Two sources of current antidiscrimination law are particularly useful in in-
forming a language accommodation norm: (1) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and its attendant regulations and federal compliance guidelines, and (2) the 
reasonable accommodation standards established under disability laws such as the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Although neither source of law provides 
an ideal model for voting rights enforcement, they do provide normative support 
for an overarching language accommodation norm and offer alternatives to the 
fixed and bounded enforcement mechanisms contained in the Voting Rights Act’s 
current language assistance provisions.  
 a. Title VI and Executive Order 13166 
Title VI has an extensive history of administrative regulation and case law 
addressing limited-English-proficiency. Title VI does not explicitly proscribe dis-
crimination based on language use or limited English proficiency, but federal 
agencies’ interpretations of the law have treated language-based discrimination as 
a species of national origin discrimination. Linguistic characteristics are often 
tightly woven with ethnicity and national origin, and a language-based policy can 
have discriminatory effects on members of a national origin group; thus, Title VI 
regulations and policy guidance typically prohibit language discrimination and 
impose obligations on funding recipients to ensure that limited-English-proficient 
individuals have meaningful access to federally funded programs. 
In Lau v. Nichols,50 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the linkage between 
language and national origin discrimination when it concluded that the failure to 
provide language assistance to non-English-speaking Chinese-American students 
in the San Francisco Unified School District violated Title VI regulations promul-
gated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The federal regula-
tions stated in part that “[w]here inability to speak and understand the English lan-
                                                          
50 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
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guage excludes national origin-minority group children from effective participa-
tion in the educational program offered by a school district, the district must take 
affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order to open its instruc-
tional program to these students.”51 Inherent in the Lau Court’s reasoning is the 
recognition of a legally significant difference and a limitation based on that differ-
ence—the inability to understand English—that gives rise to a claim of discrimi-
nation if government does not take affirmative steps to address the problem. In 
other words, there is a legally cognizable right that is violated if the government 
does not make an accommodation. 
President Clinton’s Executive Order 13166 (“Improving Access to Services 
for Persons with Limited English Proficiency”), issued in 2000, establishes spe-
cific compliance standards that require agencies and recipients of federal funding 
to ensure that limited-English-proficient individuals receive “meaningful access” 
to federal programs and activities through appropriate assistance.52 Unlike the Vot-
ing Rights Act, the meaningful access guidelines of Executive Order 13166 do not 
rely on a fixed triggering mechanism, but they do employ a metric in which group 
size and interests are weighed against the costs of providing language-appropriate 
services. The Department of Justice’s policy guidance document for the Executive 
Order establishes compliance standards for federal agencies and funding recipients 
that balance four factors: (1) the number or proportion of limited-English-
proficient persons to be served; (2) the frequency with which these individuals 
come in contact with the program; (3) the nature and importance of the program or 
service to people’s lives; and (4) the costs and resources available to the recipi-
ent.53 
When justified, extensive interpreter services and written translations can be 
provided, but in some instances, the balancing test may tip in favor of providing 
very limited assistance—especially if the group is small, the interest is not 
deemed important, and the costs significantly outweigh the benefits. For exam-
ple, the guidelines for the Department of Health and Human Services (which 
provides extensive funding for health care services) contemplates a “mix” of 
services including on-site bilingual staff, commercial telephone translation ser-
vices, family members or friends for oral interpretation, and complete, partial, or 
summary translations in the case of written materials.54 In some instances, the 
guidelines suggest that the benefits may justify only the most minimal assis-
tance, particularly when the number of individuals needing language assistance 
is small and the service is not vital. 
The enforcement of language rights under laws such as Title VI can, however, 
prove elusive. Recent case law has limited private rights of action under Title VI 
                                                          
51 See id. at 568 (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970)).  
52 Exec. Order 13166, reprinted in 65 Fed. Reg. 50121 (Aug. 11, 2000). 
53 65 Fed. Reg. 50123, 50123–-25 (Aug. 16, 2000). 
54 68 Fed. Reg. 47311, 47315–19 (Aug. 8, 2003). 
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to claims of intentional discrimination,55 Executive Orders can be rescinded, and 
policy guidance issued by federal agencies, which are hortatory and by themselves 
do not carry the force of law, can be modified or repealed. Title VI and Executive 
Order 13166 can be applied to voting, but even with the flow of federal funding to 
state and local governments involved in election administration, they are not ade-
quately utilized as enforcement tools. Government enforcement of Title VI and the 
Executive Order against election officials has essentially fallen between the cracks 
of agency responsibility: the Voting Rights Section of the Justice Department does 
not currently enforce Title VI against state or local governments, and other sec-
tions of the federal government that address program access for limited-English-
proficient individuals do not enforce voting-related claims. 
 b. Reasonable Accommodations in Disability Law  
The “reasonable accommodation” standard employed in disability law pro-
vides another source for informing a language-accommodation norm in voting 
rights law.56 The standard is well-established in laws such as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the regulations for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For 
instance, under Title I of the ADA, illegal discrimination occurs when an em-
ployer fails to make reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee who can 
perform the essential functions of a job.57 Examples of accommodations listed in 
the ADA include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reas-
signment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, 
appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or 
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar ac-
commodations.”58 
As Pamela Karlan and George Rutherglen have noted, the reasonable ac-
commodation standard can be considered a species of antidiscrimination law dis-
tinct from the more common disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
liability, because it represents a “difference” model, rather than the more custom-
ary “sameness” model that prohibits differentiation on the basis of a quality or 
trait.59 A difference model “assumes that individuals who possess the quality or 
                                                          
55 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (concluding that there is no private 
right of action to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations). 
56 The reasonable accommodation standard originated as a concept in employment 
discrimination law involving religion. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1. Employers must provide 
an accommodation for an employee’s religious observances or practices unless doing so 
would create an undue hardship. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 
(1977), the U.S. Supreme Court held that religious accommodations need only be made 
when costs are small and that anything “more than a de minimis cost” would impose an 
undue hardship. Id. at 84. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
58 Id. § 12111(9)(A). 
59 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 10. But cf. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimina-
tion and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001) (proposing strong similarities 
between traditional antidiscrimination models and accommodation models). 
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trait at issue are different in a relevant respect from individuals who don’t and that 
treating them similarly can itself become a form of oppression.”60 Disability ac-
commodations theory further suggests that conventional structures and practices in 
the workplace and other settings are premised on what is perceived to be “normal” 
and already accommodate the needs of nondisabled individuals. Providing a rea-
sonable accommodation for a disabled individual thus should be considered nei-
ther “special” nor “extra,” but simply a way of removing an existing barrier and 
stopping a different form of discrimination.61 
In practice, though, employers are not required to make every possible ac-
commodation requested, and it may be appropriate in some instances for the em-
ployee to bear some of the costs of the accommodation. Reasonable accommoda-
tion is thus a strongly individualized and case-specific standard in which disabled 
individuals and covered entities negotiate the accommodation in order to balance 
the interests of both the employee and the employer. Moreover, employers can 
avoid the accommodation requirement altogether if they can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an “undue hardship,” which is an “action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense,”62 based on weighing factors such as the cost of 
the accommodation and the entity’s size and financial resources.63  
Although only partly analogous, the barriers encountered by the limited-
English-proficient based on the “normal” nature of English language ballots and 
election materials can function in the same way that barriers in the workplace limit 
the employment opportunities of the physically or mentally disabled. The individ-
ual who is unable to comprehend fully an English-only ballot, but could exercise 
an informed and effective vote if the election materials were available in the indi-
vidual’s first language, is much like the disabled individual who is able to perform 
the essential functions of a job, if accommodations such as equipment modifica-
tions or interpreter services are made available.64 
                                                          
60 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 44, at 10 (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks and alteration omitted).  
61 Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidis-
crimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L. J. 861, 890–93 (2004). 
62 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A). 
63 Id. § 12111(10)(B). 
64 Indeed, the legislative history of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act, which 
covers blindness, disability, and illiteracy in a single sweep, captures some of the paral-
lels between disability and limited English proficiency: 
Certain discrete groups of citizens are unable to exercise their rights to vote without 
obtaining assistance in voting including aid within the voting booth. These groups in-
clude the blind, the disabled, and those who either do not have a written language or who 
are unable to read or write sufficiently well to understand the election material and the 
ballot. Because of their need for assistance, members of these groups are more suscepti-
ble than the ordinary voter to having their vote unduly influenced or manipulated. As a 
result, members of such groups run the risk that they will be discriminated against at the 
polls and that their right to vote in state and federal elections will not be protected.  
S. Rep. No 97–417, at 62 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 240. 
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B. A Language Accommodation Norm 
While it is possible to develop a voting rights model that tracks the meaning-
ful access guidelines under Title VI or the reasonable accommodations standards 
in disability law, an effective model for language accommodation in voting must 
recognize both the similarities between voting rights and other antidiscrimination 
guarantees and the differences that make voting a unique and vital element of a 
democratic society. As a vehicle for promoting civic engagement and avenues for 
political participation and empowerment, voting enjoys a venerated position in the 
array of civil and political rights. The right to vote has been recognized as a fun-
damental right for purposes of equal protection review and is considered preserva-
tive of other basic civil and political rights.65 Balancing competing claims of gov-
ernment cost or “hardship” against access to the vote seem especially inapt when 
basic franchise rights are at stake. Thus there are strong reasons for ensuring that 
the right to vote—which includes exercising a meaningful vote in which ballots 
and campaign issues are sufficiently understood—is preserved even more vigi-
lantly than can be achieved through the standards of laws such as Title VI or the 
ADA. 
An ideal model of language accommodation in voting should encompass both 
the “difference” principle of antidiscrimination law and incorporate the cost-
benefit analyses that inevitably arise with the imposition of responsibilities on 
government. However, a model of voting rights protection should also militate 
strongly against any infringement of the basic right to vote, even where the finan-
cial burden on government is significant. In other words, where “undue hardship” 
in the voting context could create the functional equivalent of voter disenfran-
chisement, the balance should tip in favor of guaranteeing access to the vote. An 
ideal model should revolve around three key elements: (1) difference recognition, 
(2) appropriate accommodations, and (3) hardship boundaries. 
1. Difference Recognition 
Recognizing that limited-English-proficiency constitutes a basis for discrimi-
nation and should be addressed through some type of language assistance is an 
essential first step in creating and implementing a language-accommodation norm. 
The current language-minority definitions of the Voting Rights Act reflect Con-
gress’s determination in 1975 that language status can closely track race and color 
as bases for discrimination in voting. The recognition of difference is thus inherent 
in the creation of the language-minority category: Congress determined that lim-
ited-English-language proficiency, specifically among Latinos, Asian Americans, 
and Native Americans, formed the basis for extensive voting discrimination. Sec-
tion 4(f) and Section 203 are grounded in group differences involving English-
language ability and literacy. 
                                                          
65 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec., 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the right to vote is fun-
damental right subject to strict scrutiny review under the equal protection clause). 
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But the differences articulated in the limited definition of “language minority” 
need not be the only ones that are recognized under the law. The current defini-
tions, particularly when applied to general antidiscrimination provisions like Sec-
tion 2, are both overinclusive and underinclusive of limited-English-proficient 
voters.66 As analogues to race, the definitions cover a spectrum of speakers and 
language communities ranging from monolingual English speakers to monolingual 
speakers of languages other than English to those with varying degrees of bilin-
gual ability.67 But not all language minority voters require assistance in order to 
cast a meaningful and effective vote. The definitions are overinclusive because 
they include voters who may suffer race-like discrimination because of status and 
group membership, but are not necessarily limited-English-proficient. On the other 
hand, the definitions are underinclusive of limited-English-proficient voters who 
fall outside the enumerated groups for purposes of the act beyond remediation for 
past discrimination; Arabic and Haitian Creole, languages that have been included 
in recent litigation remedies, are just two examples of languages whose speakers 
fall outside the formal definitions of a language minority. 
When articulated as part of a structural remedy, the language-minority cate-
gory need only include groups that Congress has found to have faced sufficient 
discrimination. But if a difference principle focusing on language is to apply to the 
general and permanent provisions of the act, then another type of definition needs 
to be deployed. One method is through the category of “national origin,” which 
has an established basis in equal protection jurisprudence and is well developed in 
the enforcement of antidiscrimination laws such as Title VI. Language proficiency 
is not directly implicated on the face of a national origin category, but agency 
regulations and guidance that parallel existing guidelines found in Title VI and 
Executive Order 13166 enforcement could ensure coverage. A second method is 
through limited-English-proficiency per se, via a distinct antidiscrimination cate-
gory that recognizes the barriers facing voters with limited English ability and an 
independent definition, such as “voters who are limited-English-proficient” or 
“voters who possess a language-based disability that limits their ability to mean-
ingfully access the vote.” Although an antidiscrimination category based specifi-
cally on language proficiency may raise constitutional questions about the scope 
                                                          
66 To say that the language-minority definitions are both underinclusive and overin-
clusive does not make them constitutionally defective, however. Underinclusive legisla-
tion is constitutionally tolerable, since legislatures may choose to address one or limited 
elements of a problem rather attack it comprehensively. See, e.g., Railway Express 
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). Overinclusiveness, in this instance, reflects 
the dual nature of the language-minority definitions; as analogues to race, they are not 
overinclusive at all, but with respect to the subset of individuals who are limited-English-
proficient, the category does not fit as tightly as a category such as “limited-English-
proficient language minorities.” 
67 Rodríguez, ACCOMMODATING LINGUISTIC DIFFERENCE, supra note 49, at 142–43 
(describing this as a “mutability continuum”). 
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of congressional power (as discussed in Part III), it could provide more clarity to 
the current definitions used in Section 2 and foster more fitting accommodations. 
2. Appropriate Accommodations 
As a consequence of recognizing that language is a characteristic in which 
treating differently situated people the same can itself constitute discrimination, a 
language-accommodation norm must create mechanisms for both individual and 
group access to the vote and must shift the costs of assistance away from the voter 
alone. A weak form of individual accommodation already exists within the Voting 
Rights Act under Section 208, while group-based accommodations are available 
under the language assistance provisions of Section 4(f) and Section 203. But even 
in combination these accommodations fall far short of an ideal regime. Section 
208 imposes no checks on the quality of the assistance, nor does it impose any 
responsibility on local officials to provide assistance. Sections 4(f) and 203 estab-
lish an accommodation system that is triggered by a combination of group defini-
tions and statistical benchmarks, but like a light that is switched either on or off, 
the structural remedy either requires full-scale remedies or none at all. The expan-
sion of litigation remedies to subbenchmark populations, as well as voluntary ef-
forts by local election officials to provide assistance to an increasing number of 
language groups, demonstrate that accommodations need not be limited to popula-
tions that satisfy statistical triggers. 
The Voting Rights Act could incorporate a wide range of accommodation 
mechanisms beyond the status quo. For instance, an array of measures short of full 
interpreter services and ballot translations could provide some measure of assis-
tance to language-minority groups that fall below the statistical benchmarks of 
Section 203. Allocating language-assistance resources could be based on inquiries 
into the size and needs of language groups and the appropriate, cost-effective 
mechanisms of assistance. When looking at groups whose size falls below the 
Section 203 triggers, a sliding scale of interpreter services and written translations 
could be developed based on group size, need, and the costs of hiring interpreters 
and creating translations.  
For example, a relatively small group, such as one containing between 2,500 
and 5,000 voting-age citizens, might justify a reduced pool of interpreters who are 
located only at key precincts or at a centralized location, along with more limited 
number of translated materials and centralized distribution areas. A larger group, 
but one still falling below the 10,000 benchmark, might require a larger deploy-
ment of interpreters and more widespread availability of translated written materi-
als. The voter could bear some costs, such as transportation or accessing materials 
through the Internet, while the government or government contractors would bear 
others. 
Moreover, if language-based differences are recognized as a basis for voting 
discrimination, language accommodations can be incorporated into potential 
remedies for violations of Section 2. The language-assistance remedies found in 
recent Section 2 cases recognize that assistance mechanisms can be key compo-
nents of make-whole remedies for past discrimination, even for smaller groups or 
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groups that fall outside the formal definition of “language minority.” In City of 
Boston, for example, the city agreed to provide an adequate supply of bilingual 
poll workers and to disseminate bilingual information to Asian-American popula-
tions that fell below the triggers of Section 203; in Miami-Dade County, the reme-
dies for Haitian Creole speakers included training programs for poll workers, voter 
education policies, and the deployment of bilingual election employees in targeted 
precincts. A nascent jurisprudence involving the act’s general antidiscrimination 
provisions can turn to recent cases such as City of Boston and Miami-Dade County 
to develop remedies that mandate governmental assistance and create incentives 
for voters to employ personal assistors. 
3. Hardship Boundaries 
Governmental resources to provide language assistance are not unlimited, so 
costs and the concept of “hardship” must be taken into account for any language 
accommodation standard. But because of the basic importance of voting in a de-
mocratic society, the cost-benefit calculus of a language-accommodation regime 
must provide a baseline for language assistance that prevents the disenfranchise-
ment of limited-English-proficient voters through competing claims of hardship by 
local jurisdictions. Under the current mandates of Section 4(f) and Section 203, the 
hardship calculation is built implicitly into the language of the statute: a jurisdic-
tion with a language-minority population falling below the statistical benchmark 
(5% or 10,000) necessarily incurs a hardship if it had to provide language assis-
tance, because the costs of providing an accommodation to a population that is 
smaller than the trigger would be excessive. But “hardship” within a broader norm 
of language accommodation need not be defined or bounded solely by numbers. 
The costs to government in providing interpreters and written materials are 
not insignificant, but the burdens in addressing the needs of relatively small popu-
lations or populations outside the strict language-minority definitions need not be 
onerous if an appropriate range of language-assistance mechanisms are in place. 
Applying the same degree of language assistance to all limited-English-proficient 
voters in a city or county that are applied to Section 203 groups could impose very 
high costs on a jurisdiction, but measures short of deploying cadres of interpreters 
and translating ballots into dozens of languages could be employed without seri-
ous hardship.  
For example, even the smallest number of limited-English-proficient voters 
can receive an accommodation by requiring jurisdictions to provide translated 
notices that voters can use individual assistors pursuant to Section 208. The finan-
cial costs of such basic notices would be minimal if they entailed translating (1) a 
small number of sentences and printing them on election materials designed for 
the general populace, and (2) more extensive materials that are strategically tar-
geted for distribution to the appropriate language group. Oral notices, particularly 
for voters whose language has no written component, could be distributed via re-
corded public service announcements or to community organizations that work 
closely with the relevant populations. With the basic right to vote at stake, mini-
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mally burdensome measures should be employed so that at least some accommo-
dation exists for all limited-English-proficient voters in a jurisdiction. 
Taken together, the difference recognition, appropriate accommodations, and 
hardship boundaries of a language-accommodation norm are rooted in antidis-
crimination law, drawing on theories and standards that are well established in 
both the Voting Rights Act and related areas of law. As discussed in the next sec-
tion, staying within the boundaries of antidiscrimination law is essential for offer-
ing language assistance through the Voting Rights Act and still staying within 
recent constitutional constraints imposed upon Congress by the courts. 
III. Implementing Language Accommodation 
Implementing a language-accommodation norm within the Voting Rights Act 
requires amendments to the current statute, as well as parallel developments in 
administrative regulations and case law. This section discusses the constitutional 
limitations on implementing a language-accommodation norm and suggests a 
strategy that focuses on both amending the current language-assistance provi-
sions and creating legislation to expand other areas of the law. It concludes with 
recommendations for stronger enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Help America Vote Act of 2002. 
A. Constitutional Limitations 
At first glance, the basic constitutionality of language assistance under the 
Voting Rights Act would seem uncontroversial. Congressional exercises of power 
to enforce the protections of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments via the act 
have been almost entirely upheld as constitutional and have been used as judicial 
benchmarks for comparing other legitimate exercises of congressional powers. In 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,68 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitution-
ality of major sections of the Voting Rights Act as consistent with Congress’s 
powers to address discrimination pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment. In Katzen-
bach v. Morgan,69 the Court specifically upheld the constitutionality of using Sec-
tion 4(e) to prohibit enforcement of a New York law that required English literacy 
as a precondition for voting and that discriminated against limited-English-
speaking Puerto Rican voters educated in Spanish-dominant schools. The Morgan 
Court concluded that Congress had broad powers to ban literacy tests consistent 
with both congressional findings of past discrimination and congressional interpre-
tation of the equal protection clause.70 The court thus concluded that Section 4(e) 
                                                          
68 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
69 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
70 The Morgan Court upheld congressional powers pursuant to the Voting Rights 
Act, even though the Supreme Court had previously ruled that literacy tests were not 
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was “a proper exercise of the powers granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”71 
However, congressional power over voting rights enforcement is not unlim-
ited and was tempered in Oregon v. Mitchell, where a divided Court upheld sev-
eral of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, but struck down the section 
of the act that lowered the minimum age in state and local elections from twenty-
one to eighteen as exceeding congressional powers.72 More recent case law outside 
of the voting arena has further circumscribed Congress’s powers to breach state 
sovereign immunity and to remedy discrimination pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, casting some doubt on Morgan’s vitality as a general 
precedent.73 Moreover, the powers of Congress to address language-based dis-
crimination per se, rather than as a species of racial and national origin discrimina-
tion, remain problematic because the status of language groups under the Four-
teenth Amendment is poorly defined by Supreme Court case law. Each of these 
constricting factors must be considered in developing any language accommoda-
tion regime. 
1. Congruence and Proportionality Requirements 
Since the late 1990s, the Supreme Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence has 
imposed significant limits on congressional powers to create remedies against the 
states in order to address discrimination. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court 
distinguished legislation that is “remedial” and falls within the powers of Congress 
under Section 5 and legislation that makes a “substantive change” in rights and 
thus exceeds congressional powers.74 The Court stated: “Congress does not en-
force a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the 
power ‘to enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional 
violation.”75 The Court further concluded that “[t]here must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
                                                                                                                                  
prohibited under the federal constitutional itself. Id. at 652–53; see Lassiter v. Northamp-
ton Elec. Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
71 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652–53.  
72 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
73 See generally Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance 
Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L. J. 177 
(2005); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental Rights, and Voting, 56 ALA. L. REV. 
793 (2005). 
74 521 U.S. 507 (1997). City of Boerne focused on the constitutionality of the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which was enacted in 1993 in response to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990), where the Court relaxed the protections of the First Amendment’s free exer-
cise clause in upholding a state drug law that Native Americans challenged as an in-
fringement on their religious beliefs and their ceremonial use of peyote. The City of 
Boerne Court concluded that Congress’s attempt to overturn the Smith case through the 
RFRA exceeded its § 5 powers. 521 U.S. at 508–34. 
75 521 U.S. at 519. 
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adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substan-
tive in operation and effect.”76  
The congruence and proportionality test was further coupled with a height-
ened evidentiary standard in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett to require that Congress thoroughly document state discrimination against 
a protected group in order to justify the piercing of sovereign immunity.77 The 
Garrett Court held that Congress had exceeded its powers by authorizing individ-
ual lawsuits for damages against state governments for violations of Title I of the 
ADA, which contains the ADA’s reasonable accommodation standards for em-
ployment. Arguing that because disability discrimination is not subject to height-
ened review under the equal protection clause, and because the ADA’s reasonable 
accommodation mandate goes far beyond what the constitution requires, the 
Garrett Court concluded that Congress’s response lacked proportionality and con-
gruency. The majority found Congress’s legislative record on disability-based 
discrimination by states to be insufficient; a pattern of widespread state discrimi-
nation against the disabled, going beyond the record of private discrimination, 
would have been necessary to support a strong congressional remedy. 
Some of the Court’s most recent cases have lessened Garrett’s evidentiary re-
quirements, at least in cases involving gender discrimination and the fundamental 
interest in gaining access to the courts, which are both subject to heightened re-
view under the equal protection clause. In Nevada Department of Human Re-
sources v. Hibbs,78 the Court upheld the authorization of lawsuits against states 
under the Family Medical Leave Act, which entitles eligible employees to take up 
to twelve weeks of unpaid annual leave from work for, among other things, seri-
ous health conditions affecting a spouse. The Hibbs Court did not insist on a 
strong empirical basis for the contention that gender-role stereotyping and dis-
crimination often occur through differential state employment policies, relying on 
the fact that the Court had already recognized that gender should be subject to 
heightened equal protection review. Similarly, in Tennessee v. Lane79 the Court 
upheld congressional action authorizing lawsuits against states for violating Title 
II of the ADA, which prohibits the exclusion of disabled individuals from public 
services and programs, where the disabled plaintiff was denied the fundamental 
right of access to courts. 
The Court’s federalism jurisprudence continues to evolve, so there are no ab-
solute answers to the question of whether a language accommodation regime 
would necessarily satisfy the Court’s most recently developed standards. There 
are, nevertheless, strong parallels between language assistance in voting and the 
factual and legal predicates of Hibbs and Lane. Like access to the courts, the right 
to vote is a fundamental interest that can invoke strict scrutiny under the equal 
protection clause. Moreover, both the courts and Congress have documented dis-
                                                          
76 Id. at 520.  
77 531 U.S. 356 (2000). 
78 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
79 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
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crimination against members of language-minority groups, and national origin has 
been squarely recognized as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes. 
Hibbs itself also suggests that the Court is willing to accept weak versions of ac-
commodations as proportional responses to equal protection violations. Requiring 
employers to grant unpaid leave time is a mild form of accommodation designed 
to shift some of the costs of family-related leaves to the employer. 
In any case, any accommodation requirements that go beyond the existing re-
quirements of the Voting Rights Act must be well supported by evidence of dis-
crimination.80 In 2006, Congress compiled an extensive record to establish the 
proportionality of its response in reauthorizing Sections 4(f) and 203. For instance, 
the House Judiciary Committee’s report on H.R. 9 summarized several of its find-
ings in this way: 
The continued need for bilingual support is reflected by: (1) the increased number 
of linguistically isolated households, particularly among Hispanic and Asian 
American communities; (2) the increased number of language minority students 
who are considered to be English language learners, such that students do not 
speak English well enough to understand the required curriculum and require 
supplemental classes; (3) the continued disparity in educational opportunities as 
demonstrated by the disparate impact that budget shortfalls have on language mi-
nority citizens, and the continued need for litigation to protect English language 
learners; and (4) the lack of available literacy centers and English as a Second 
Language programs.81 
This type of evidence, along with additional evidence on discrimination and 
growing needs among limited-English-proficient voters outside the current lan-
guage-minority groups, would lead many courts to uphold language mandates as 
constitutional.82 
                                                          
80 In finding a lack of proportionality between the ADA’s reasonable accommoda-
tion requirements and the record of state government discrimination against the disabled, 
the Garrett Court noted that the accommodation duty under the ADA “far exceeds what 
is constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternate responses that 
would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an ‘undue burden’ upon the em-
ployer. The Act also makes it the employer’s duty to prove that it would suffer such a 
burden, instead of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate 
reasonable bases for the employer’s decision.” 531 U.S. at 372. Even with the more re-
laxed standards implied by Hibbs and Lane, the Court’s admonition against unusually 
strong accommodation remedies argues in favor of creating a strong evidentiary record of 
past discrimination in the language arena. 
81 H.R. Rep. No. 109–478, at 59 (2006). 
82 See, e.g., Abdelall, supra note 30, at 924–32 (discussing discrimination and lan-
guage assistance needs among Arab Americans). 
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2. Language as a Suspect Classification  
Another key question is whether accommodations that create statutory rights 
on the basis of language proficiency alone would satisfy constitutional require-
ments. As currently defined, the act’s language-minority category closely tracks 
race and national origin; however, adding a new definition such as “discrimination 
based on language proficiency” poses another set of questions regarding Con-
gress’s expansion of the equal protection clause beyond its current constellation of 
rights. The Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence regarding language 
status, untethered from race or national origin, is not well developed, and the 
Court has never held that limited-English-proficiency alone is a suspect classifica-
tion deserving heightened scrutiny.83  
Unlike agency regulations that have enunciated a connection between lan-
guage and disparate impacts on national origin groups, the Court’s equal protec-
tion jurisprudence has been nearly silent on the relationship between language and 
national origin. While the Supreme Court has struck down bans on the use of lan-
guages other than English as violating due process,84 it has had little to say about 
protections for limited-English-proficient individuals. In Hernandez v. New York, 
the Supreme Court’s only modern case addressing language-based discrimination 
under the equal protection clause, the Court upheld the use of peremptory strikes 
by prosecutors who argued that they had struck potential jurors in a jury venire 
based on their bilingualism and their potential inability to listen and follow a court 
interpreter, not on race or national origin.85 Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in 
Hernandez rejected a connection between bilingual ability and race under the spe-
cific facts of the case, but he did make clear that language could in some instances 
serve as proxy for race: 
Just as shared language can serve to foster community, language differences can 
be a source of division. Language elicits a response from others, ranging from 
admiration and respect, to distance and alienation, to ridicule and scorn. Reactions 
of the latter type all too often result from or initiate racial hostility. . . . It may well 
                                                          
83 Indeed, a number of lower federal courts have held that language does not identify 
members of a suspect class and have upheld English-only public services and conditions 
as constitutional. In Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, for instance, the Second Circuit rejected a 
claim that the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ failure to provide forms in Span-
ish violated equal protection, and stated: “A classification is implicitly made, but it is on 
the basis of language, i.e., English-speaking versus non-English-speaking individuals, 
and not on the basis of race, religion or national origin. Language, by itself, does not 
identify members of a suspect class.” 717 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 
U.S. 929 (1984); see also Frontera v. Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1975) (“We 
are not dealing here with a suspect nationality or race.”); Carmona v. Sheffield, 475 F.2d 
738, 739 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the state’s choice “to deal only in English has a 
reasonable basis”). 
84 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 
500 (1926). 
85 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
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be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a par-
ticular language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an 
equal protection analysis.86 
Without a square holding that limited-English-proficiency forms the basis for 
a suspect classification, a language-accommodation measure must either be cou-
pled analytically with race or national origin or it must be evaluated through the 
lens of rationality review, which implies that the City of Boerne/Garrett line of 
cases may constrain the remedies and accommodations developed on the basis of 
limited-English-proficiency. This is not to say that Congress cannot prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of English proficiency; the legislative response must be 
proportional, and the Court’s more searching review of antidiscrimination laws 
based on the nonsuspect classes of age87 and disability suggests that there may be 
comparable restrictions on congressional measures addressing language discrimi-
nation. Consequently, a safer course to help ensure the constitutionality of an ac-
commodations measure under the Voting Rights Act may be to rely on a group 
definition such as national origin, which rests on solid constitutional ground as a 
suspect classification, and to employ administrative regulations to help cement the 
relationship between limited-English-proficiency and national origin discrimina-
tion. 
B. Enforcing Accommodations Norms  
In recent years, there has not been a groundswell of legislative activity to 
expand language rights, and it would be naive to ignore the political opposition 
to subsidizing governmental language assistance of any kind, whether in the 
voting arena or in areas such as education and social services. Indeed, the depth 
of the controversies over language assistance crystallized in 2006 during the 
House of Representatives’ floor debates on H.R. 9, which reauthorized Sections 
4(f) and 203 for an additional twenty-five years. An amendment offered by Rep-
resentative Steve King would have eliminated the act’s language assistance pro-
visions, but was defeated by a 238–185 vote—an indication that current opposi-
tion to language assistance measures is well beyond token. Given present-day 
political constraints, a pragmatic strategy for legislative change could focus on 
modest changes to the language-assistance provisions, documented by adequate 
                                                          
86 Id. at 371. 
87 In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court ruled that Congress’s authoriza-
tion of damages lawsuits against the states through the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act exceeded Congress’s Section 5 powers because there had been no historical 
pattern of age discrimination and because age is not a “suspect class” subject to height-
ened review under the equal protection claus—and indeed can be a legitimate basis for 
government classifications. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Congress’s abrogation of sovereign im-
munity therefore lacked congruence and proportionality. 
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research and evidence of ongoing discrimination against language groups, as 
well as changes to the permanent provisions of the act and its implementing 
regulations. 
Amending Section 4(f) and Section 203. As discussed above, the language-
assistance provisions offer no safety net for language-minority voters whose num-
bers fall below the statistical triggers. Lowering numerical thresholds to a figure 
such as 7,500 offers a useful amendment that could lead to coverage of more ju-
risdictions and more voters, but it would still replicate a model that offers no pro-
tections for subtrigger populations. A more flexible, sliding scale approach would 
offer a preferable regime—not as a substitute, but as an adjunct to a threshold 
mechanism that requires full accommodations for large-enough language-minority 
groups in a jurisdiction. Subtrigger groups could be ordered by categories—for 
example, (A) 9,999–7,500, (B) 7,499–5,000, (C) 4,999–2,500, and (D) 2,499 or 
below—and appropriate accommodations, such as partial or targeted language 
assistance, could be deployed with each category. For purposes of structural reme-
diation, the basic definitions of the language-minority groups do not have to be 
amended, except to reflect Congress’s addition of groups that have been shown to 
have suffered comparable levels of discrimination in education and the political 
process. 
Section 2 and Regulatory Enforcement. The permanent provisions of the Vot-
ing Rights Act raise a different set of issues, particularly with the Supreme Court’s 
recent cases posing limits on the creation of accommodations that might exceed 
congressional powers. The language minority definition in Section 2, drawn from 
the act’s remedial provisions, creates race-like categories to address status-based 
discrimination, but it does not adequately address language proficiency as a dis-
tinct source of voting discrimination. Adding “national origin” as a basis for illegal 
discrimination would remove the limits imposed by the current definitions and 
allow the importation of administrative standards from other federal civil rights 
laws.  
Along with an amendment to the statute, regulations comparable to the Title 
VI and Executive Order 13166 agency mandates would add greater clarity to Sec-
tion 2’s general prohibition on discrimination and provide additional support for 
litigation remedies. Without duplicating the requirements under Section 203 and 
Section 4(f), regulations could focus on mandates and recommendations that cover 
all limited-English-speaking voters in a jurisdiction and do not require that illiter-
acy levels for language groups exceed the national average. A regulatory scheme 
could also include mechanisms for jurisdictions to provide notices of the Section 
208 assistor provisions to all voters in their ballot materials and to translate notices 
based on cost-benefit calculations. This is an example of a minimally intrusive 
requirement that should conform to constitutional limits.  
Applying Title VI to Voting Rights. Title VI and Executive 13166 Order offer 
statutory and regulatory bases for developing flexible language-accommodation 
measures. Although private rights of action to enforce Title VI’s disparate impact 
regulations can no longer be initiated because of recent Supreme Court case law, 
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agency action is still available to enforce the regulations.88 The Department of 
Justice can enforce these regulations and guidelines directly, while various federal 
agencies can attach requirements through their funding programs, including the 
payments and grants in support of the Help America Vote Act, which offers sub-
stantial federal dollars for improvements to state and local election systems.89 
Election Assistance Laws. Given the constitutional limitations on congres-
sional remedies under the antidiscrimination laws, election laws such the Help 
America Vote Act that are predicated on federal funding offer additional mecha-
nisms to enforce language-accommodation norms. HAVA itself offers a system of 
government payments and grants that allows language measures to be incorpo-
rated into states’ voting system improvements and technological innovations. The 
law already contains provisions for payments to the states for “[i]mproving the 
accessibility and quantity of polling places, including providing physical access 
for individuals with disabilities, providing nonvisual access for individuals with 
visual impairments, and providing assistance to Native Americans, Alaska Native 
citizens, and to individuals with limited proficiency in the English language.”90 
Moreover, HAVA requires that voting systems for federal elections must “provide 
alternative language accessibility pursuant to the requirements of section 203 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”91 
Although still viewed with some skepticism and still presenting security and 
accessibility problems, new technologies such as direct record electronic voting 
systems do have the potential to lower the costs and burdens imposed upon gov-
ernment to implement written translations. The lack of appropriations to support 
the HAVA mandates has been a major stumbling block to developing voting sys-
tems with strong language accommodations.92 But HAVA and other election assis-
tance laws based on congressional appropriations still have the potential to provide 
greater access to limited-English-proficient voters, as well as the advantage of 
bypassing the strictures of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on congressional 
enforcement by being attached to Congress’s spending powers, rather than Con-
gress’s powers pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Conclusion 
When Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1975 to recognize discrimi-
nation against language minorities, it created powerful mechanisms to ensure the 
right to vote and to increase the participation of minority voters. Yet, the guaran-
                                                          
88 Private rights of action remain viable as well, as long as intentional discrimination 
is alleged. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001). 
89 42 U.S.C. § 15301 et seq. 
90 Id. § 15301(b)(1)(G). 
91 Id. § 15481(a)(4). 
92 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfran-
chisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1219 (2005). 
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tees have been uncertain and often incomplete. The current law has limitations, 
and the proposed model of language accommodation attempts to improve the 
statute and its implementation and to place the Voting Rights Act in greater 
alignment with other federal antidiscrimination laws. But implementing a small 
yet important set of changes in a single law must also be supported by a broader 
norm that acknowledges the linguistic diversity of the United States and an over-
riding goal of increasing civic engagement and electoral participation by all 
Americans. An antidiscrimination policy is not a substitute for an agenda that 
also includes public policies under which both language assistance and English-
language learning are integrated into public services and the educational system. 
The proposed model is simply one step in advancing that agenda. 
